History of Medieval Philosophy (Russell Friedman)

Lecture 1: Introduction and Ancient Philosophy background

- 11 week course
- course pack
- buy Copleston
- 3 hour written exam, 4 questions
- evt. J. Marenborn, *History of Medieval Philosophy* (too detailed)

> 2 classes on AGUSTINE (+ 430): most influential medieval philosopher

> 2 classes on ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (+1109) father of scholastism, ontological proof of God's existence (*On Truth)*

> Peter ABELARD (+1142) *Ethics*

>Thomas AQUINAS (+1274) > HIW founded as a Thomistic institution to combat rising secularism by Mercier(revival in Catholic community of Thomistic philosophy in the 19th century)

> John DUNS SCOTUS (+1308) ("duns" means "stupid"):

!2 influential discussions

a) *universals* (realism vs. nominalism) e.g. is there an entity correpsonding to my conscience of a tree? >inspires VAN FRAASSEN (Princeton) uses Scotus in his philosophy of science

b) (ideas on) *Free Will and Contingency*: Scotus defends a *libertarian* vue of free will and freedom[1] > inspires modern action theorists and people who look at free will today

> William OCKHAM (+1347): on *Ethics* and on (today called) *Language of thought/ Mental language*[2]

- Copleston = jesuit priest, wrote a 9 volume history of philosophy, book on ME philsophy (1972)

Utility: 1) to fill-up knowledge
2) safety line

Exam is on lectures! Exam question will be roughly the equivalent of one-day lecture. We'll be given a question, some texts we should put it in a context (understand it, why it's significant, put it in a wider philosophical context and raise the problems that are linked to it)

MEPh is a field exploding with new insights, lots of change.

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[1] I.e. The will is just *free*, that defines the will; It can do something or not.

[2] "Thought takes place in a language"; reminds of 'natural languages' such as English or Dutch

(e.g. Copleston gives a view on Abelard, common at the time: sharp at shooting holes in Abelard, but no much ideas of is own <> today considered the best logician of the MA, lots of ideas of his own)

'Medieval': 450 AD (end of Wetsern Roman Empire) - 1450 AD (End of Byzantine Era)
between > ancient world
-wonderful literature of Homer, Sophocles, Cicero; philosophy by Plato and Aristotle
> Renaissance
- "ancient world is shining light" (literature, architecture), after scholastic nonsens
e.g. Petrarca (negative view) > influential:
[The warm feeling about the MA comes from the romantic era (19 century)]

Difficult to know what MEPh. wrote (lots of unedited work > unavailability, lack of scholarly tradition). Only Aquinas had large translations in major languages.

'Philosophy': Mixed topics: - ethics (how to conduct your life, according to which values, ...)
- metaphysics (what kind of things there are)
- philosophical psychology (how does the mind works, what is the soul (if there is one)?)

Constant feature:
God is *omnipresent* / religious context / attitude (cf. trained theologians)
cf. analytical philosophy and the positive sciences

MEP is like going on a vacation: being open to something new, broaden your horizon
> may not be directly applicable, but have a general applicability, get a different perspective to think on the major philosophical problems
e.g. relation between religion and reason

'History': To have an idea of the bigger picture (overview), from Augustine and how he related to the ancient world, right up to the 14th century

5th century vs. 14th century

+ major issues and major approaches
+ get acquainted with the vocabulary

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break

First part of MA: Augustine > Anselm
- heavily influenced by Plato (347 BC) and Neo-Platonism

Second part of MA: After Anselm (13th C): Aristotle (+322 BC) comes into play

Plato and Aristotle worked in the City-State

Pre-Socratic era: problem *par excellence* = problem of change
e.g. chessnut > huge tree / What *is* the tree? Chesnutt, large tree, tree with leaves or without?

a) HERACLITUS (panta rhei), something is always becoming something else (foot/river)

> there is only *becoming*

b) PARMENIDES (change is an illusion: what is is and cannot not-be)

> nothing ever changes > Zeno's paradoxes (arrow,...)

> there is only *being*

Middle way: PLATO: world of the forms

> basic division between - **sensing** (we inhabit the sensory world, which is a world of *becoming*, we can't possibly *know*[3] anything about the sensory world)

and - **understanding** (world of the unchanging forms / ideas that exist more than the forms down here)

How to reach the division? There is a lot of beauty but what allows me to identify if all this things have beauty? > there must be some unchanging standards (e.g. idea of beauty)

> "All of these instances partake (intanciate) in them": In virtue of their partaking at the idea that they are (beautiful). They allow us to judge things to be bueatiful etc. and they allow the things to *be* (in virtue of their partaking).

Plato's solution for the problem of change: there can still be something that *is* while allowing for the empiricam fact that things are constantly changing.

How do we get access to the forms when we only get access to sensory things: **theory of recollection** (before my life, my soul was in direct contact with the forms, my contact with the sensory world allows me to recollect the acquaintence that I had).

2 consequences of the theory of the Theory of recollection[4]:

a) My soul and my body are separable > Plato argues for reincarnation
> attractive for Christian philosophy (soul survives the body, will be judged)

Cf. second point of definition: 'a soul is what makes a living thing live', 'if it's alive, it has a soul' (= shared by Plato, Aristotle and alle the ME Philosophers up to the 14the Century) > *animate* objects
> lots of discussion about nature of the soul (material or not), but no discussion on the fact tyhat what lives has a soul

b) The body / matter is an epistemological burden (I can't understand as well when I'm in my body) > problematic for Christians because bodies were created (*creatio ex nihilo)* "matter is a bad thing" = "God's creation isn't flawless"

A lot of Plato's philosophy is about 'oughts' / 'ethics'

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[3] Basic definition of knowledge shared in Ancient Ph and medieval Ph: 'knowledge is about what is immutable, necessary, universal'

[4] Before I was born, I had immediate access to the forms and I had knowledge (cf. object=forms=ummutable, necessary and universal)

Basic opinion herited from Socrates > "no one knowingly does evil (= ethical intellectalism)": doing the wrong thing means that you don't know the right thing. > ethics is knowledge-based, is intellectually based, is teachable! <> Augustine!!

(The only work accessible to the philosophers of the MA, and very influential into the 12th Century: *Timaeus* > efforts on making it work together with creation)

Plato was more influential because of neo-platonism which influenced Augustine heavily. > The MA is platonic in large part due to Augistine!
Aristotle's influence is very minor until the 12th Century (only his works on logic, translated by i.a. Boethius).
But in the 13th Century > Europe goes bananas for Aristotle, huge digestion of Aristotelian philosophy: what does it mean and can it work together with Christian faith (= major questions)?

'Partaking' as the relation between particulars and the forms, Aristotle says it's metaphorical and replaces the notion! Aristotle's student (Alexander The Great) incorporates Greece with ist city-states in an enormous empire > hellenistic period.
Sociologists see the transition from City-State to huge empire in the *thought* that's produced (Philosophy becomes a very practical affair). The world of the Polis is gone, together with the safety and the sense of meaning that came with it. People took their meaning (zingeving) from their being part of a cosy polis >> people being influenced/impacted by anonimous forces beyond their controll.
!Philosophies had to be designed to learn peaple how to deal with the big, hostile world > ethical theories (= practical) e.g. Stoics,Epicurians, Neo-Platonists saying two things:

a) Keep away from wordly things, they will only y make you unhappy (worry about losing them)
b) Don't worry about dead
    - epicurists on material grounds: soul dissipates, no afterlife
    - neoplatonists: dying creates possible union with God = good thing

>> Religions say these thing, a lot of religions give this advice: how to prepare mentally for the confrontation with a hostile world.

Cf. Augustine's text on how to immunise myself to the struggles that make life miserable
> border figure:
- born in Roman Empire, at his dead the Roman Empire to be taken over
- Christianity was the leading religion at the moment of his dead
- describes his philosophy as intellectuel odyssea / journey
    # conversions: **1)** to **philosophy** (seek the truth)
    2) manicheïsm
    (world powered by two forces: evil vs. good
    body - soul
    darkness - light)
    Satisfied him (also to justify his sexual appetite)
    3) Christianity

- *Confessiones* as a classic of Western Literature, showing what to do, according to Augistine, to stay happy and not sin and how to deal with a hostile world

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End Lecture 1

Lecture 2: Augustine on Evil, Sin, Happiness and Free Will

Augustinus= Trained orator, had a silver tongue
> *Confessiones* = nice introduction, but no rigourous argumentative text
(=general for Augustinus, who is more suggestive)

Text one
Augustine is agonized by a crime he committed at the age of 16: stealing pears to throw them to the pigs. Why such abig deal? What is the significance of the pear tree episode?

a) (**Literary**) > episode reminded him of the original sin (Adam & Eve), disobeying God
> Augustine takes advantage of the resonance

b) (**Morality**) **Anti-ethical intellectualism** (Socrates and Plato): "no one knowingly does evil"
S + P: doing something wrong is a cognitive failure, you haven't understood
Augustine knew all well that what he was doing was wrong and yet, he did it anyway >> S &P were wrong, it's not because of not hacving understood the situation that leads you to de evil acts, understanding better wouldn't have you refrain from the act.
> There has to be another reason: we *can* do evil, even when we know we're doing so
> There has to be another way to explain moral evil.

c) (Action Theory) **He commiited the crime to commit, he did it because it was wrong.** This seems to go against his own action theory
The theft of the pears was is a sin comiited in full knowledge of its being sin, a crime for the sake of the crime.

> Augustine worries / doesn't see where this might possibly stop (doing something for the sake of the crime) (cf. 'slippery slope')
> Augustine questions what it could have been that made him do it (motivation)? it seems a motiveless action. It can't be the crime itself, he seems to be suggesting. > basic action theory
subjectively fear of losing or desire of gaining something (e.g. somebody's wife)
objective motivator: the object of desire

Problem in pear tree episode: what motivates us to do bad things?
Closely related, according to A., is why we are unhappy and how we can avoid being unhappy.

Despite the fact that everyone wants to be happy, most of us seem unhappy. How is that? How can we be happy?
= key issue for Augustine
Cf. end of Antiquity - world become a big hostile environment -

p. 232, section 28: "our life on earth is a long, unbroken period of trial" = example of this anxiety of the late antique world.

'Why we do bad things' and 'why are we unhappy' linked by **THE FREE WILL** (= central element, the key feature, takes the place of what S&P called 'a cognitive failure').

- our will is free
- we all want to be happy
> if we are unhappy / if we do wrong things, it's beacuse we are willing 'out of order'/'inordinately', we are willing in a way that we ought not will, we're braking some kind of order
So, there is **an order: a 'hierarchy of being' = the great chain of being**[5]
- God
- Angels
- Human beings
- Animals
- Plants
- Inanimate objects (I-Pads, diamants)

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[5] This is a common feature / part of philosophy from Plato (the form of the 'good' has the most being) >> Levinas

> existence = *analog view of existence* in stead of digital, some things exist more than others (= platonic idea: only the forms have full existence) >> Augustine = gradualist ontology (there are degrees of being), allows us to eat meat (gradualist view today)
> God is complete being <> neo-platonists say that God is beyond being, so Augustine's hierarchy
// God is pure Truth, pure Goodness
cf. ***convertibility of transcendental properties*** **(CTP)** [6]**:**
To the extent that something is good, it is also true, beautiful and to that extent it also exists.
Because of the convertibility you can substitute a transcendental property for another.

So: the scale of being is equally a scale/hierarchy of goodness and a scale of beauty > inanimate exist less than all above, are less good,...

The only thing that exists as it should is God, all the rest can be better than they are (animals, humans, cf. *plus est en vous*).

The hierarchy **has a causal aspect/dimension**: the things higher up rule and govern the things lower down, causality flows downwards.
(Aquinas will say that some human beings are higher up than others, and we should increase our being: a scale of being within each degree)

Important examples:
VI) 'The mind is one thing and the body is another'
= a very platonic way of loooking at the soul;
after death the soul goes off and has direct cognitive acquaintance with the forms, it survives the body
> Augustine picks up the sharp distinction

I) 'If you want to define the mind for yourself, and so ask what the mnd is, it is easy to reply. For it seems to be *a certain substance, partaking in reason, and fitted to rule the body*'
= even in one particular being, this causal order takes place: your minds are fitted to rule over your bodies. Human beings are mixtures of mind/soul and body. Take away the soul and the body is matter, an inanimate object. the soul is higher up on the **scale of being**, so the **downward causality** makes that the soul should govern the body, and this is **part of the wy to explain sin and unhappiness.**
cf. text 2 p. 86: "sins of self-indulgence are committed when the soul fails to govern the impulses from which it derives bodily pleasure" > if te soul doesn't rule over the body > disorder > sin > unhapiness

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Break

Order in the universe, even within human beings, the order has a downwards causality: the higher should rule over the lower (cf. humans: soul should govern the body; if not, sin and unhappiness arises). Order is good! When lower things rule and govern over hingher things > things are out of order > problems, sinning, unhappiness.
Cf. II) Soul, the seat of reason, is the highest element in a human being, sets us off from animals, makes us 'higher' than animals. Things are ordered and just when the higher rules over the lower.
= explanation on how evil occurs (i.e. the sinning, i.e. what makes us unhappy) and how to become happy (i.e. make sure the order is restored). Willing inordinately causes unhappiness.
Text 2, section 5 p. 48: 'Things can be occasions of sin because, good though they are, they are part of the lowest order of good, and if we are to much tempted by them we abandon thise higher and better things, your truth, your law, and you yourself. Earthly things can give joy, though not such joy as ly God'.
> Tendency to forget the things by which we shoud be governed. Not thinking at the higher things, but acting on the lower things.
> We get unhappy because we're willing things that can be taken away against our will. We're willing things that come and go. All these goods of a lower order can come and go.
[we knowingly break God's command beacuse we're tempted so much by lower things that we set aside the higher law, we ignore it. That's what happens when inanimate objects, or bodily temptetions come to govern over reason/soul]

How can these lower things govern us? Because we *freely choose* to let them do so!

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[6] Apply to all things.

cf. **III**: reason is more powerful than bodily urges, virtue is stronger than vice. > no vicious spirit can ever force a virtuous spirit to sin. Because of convertibility of transcendental properties: evil spirits don't have the ontological force to make a virtuous spirit to will something that makes unhappy.
A virtuous spirit can become a vicious one and vice versa.
All depends on the ontological order/hierarchy of goodness, being, truth. Things lower down really can't influence things up.

[Thomas Aquinas: convertibility of being and good: all human beings have a certain amount of existence, higher than animals and sofort; among human beings there are ontological variations (Mandela vs. Hitler)]

When you are allowing inanimate object power over you, you are letting your body overpower your rationality - you're letting your rationality getting overpowered by the body.
Things attached to bodily urges, animal desires (comfort, status, the craving for praise/glory) are not making us good, when they become an end in itself > unhappy.
Evil doesn't exist, insofar as Lucifer exists, it's good, but way down.

Flypside of the CTP: if everything that exists, is to that extent good, than nothing is evil *an sich*. Evil doesn't exist.

What might have forced you to become unhappy? It's your own fault, evil comes from us, from our free will, we have to *choose* to do wrong, by chosing to allow goods of a lower order to govern over you rather than to let our rationality rule over them.
The choices have repercussions (e.g. stealing the pears and throwing them away) > freely choosing to allow an inanimate object have power over you, you're actually willing something that can be taken away against your will (stolen I-pads, burnt houses) = setting yourself up for anxiety, for unhappiness. If you don't love your friends 'in God' you're going to be anxious about losing him: you should be considering the friend as a gift from God. Friendship is just great, but if you focus on your friend for itself, then your focussing on something that can be taken away against your will! > solution: *focus on God and Gods law* (> can't be taken away against your will). Friendship will be richer if you're doing it 'in God', out of love for God.
[Unhappiness comes from willing incorrectly, you're willing things that make you unhappy because they come and go; start willing the only thing that cannot be taken away from you against your will (God and his Law)].

Rationality is important, you have to be able to know the Law in order to choose not to do it. The Law is written in your heart. When you're choosing to steal, you're letting inanimate objects gain controll over you.
> how is this possible, since no inanimate object has power over a spirit? Cf. alarm clock example: you *let* it exercice power over you, you render it the mastery over you (free will!).

Augustine's message to a troubled world is: think about the things that can be taken away from you against your will, don't get attached to material objects, don't be afraid from death. Will only things that are higher on the scael of being. Hereto he deploys concept as 'hierarchy of being' and 'downward causality'.
Willing things below you on the hierarchy of being will make you unhappy, will make you sin,...

Augustine is bothered because he doesn't find an *objective motivation* for the pear-tree episode.
a) peer-pressure (**friendship** was the root of his sin, he wanted to impress his friends)
b) **pride** (he wanted to be like God cf. original sin, trying to be the big guy)

[Free will allows you to sin, but also allows you to resist sinning]

Copleston **on Augustine [Church Fathers]:**

1) Chiefly occupied with working out basic Christian doctrines and participating in theological controversies (22-23).
2) By using platonic and stoic ideas in the development of theological themes, they helped to counterbalance the impact of Aristotelianism (23)
3) Augustine was first and foremost a theologian, his philosophical reflections showed 'very great ability' (B. Russell) (26)
4) Cicero's *Hortensius* impelled him to seek wisdom (27)
5) Neo-platonism convinced him that: a) there is a spiritual reality and b) the presenceof iveil could be reconciled with divine creation, for evil is a *privation*. > facilitated his conversion to Christianity (28)
6) Men's desire for hapiness is the cause or ground for philosophy. Philosophizing is the search for wisdom and true wisdom is to be found only in the knowledge and possession of God. philosophy as the pursuit of hapiness and the knowledge of God (30)

7) Didn't make any clear distinction between theology and philosophy(30). Maintained that faith preceded but that it should be followed, wherever possible, by understanding (31).
8) *Si fallor, sum* (if I am decieved, I am) as an anticipation of Descartes, but didn't try to make it this truth the basis of a philosophical system (31).
9) (epistemology) The error lies in my judgment of the testimony of sense, not in the testimony itself. External things cause modification in the sense organs, but the the corporeal cannot act upon the incorporeal/spiritual. The soul, noticing the modifications in the sense organs, forms its judgments, whereas the senses make no judgments (32).
10) No series of developed proofs of the existence of God. He starts from the standpoint of faith. (34)
11) Substituted his own theory of 'divine illumination'[7] for Plato's theory of reminiscence (35). It's a light sui generis, an hypothesis to explain how the human mind can apprehend truths which in some sense trancend it or are superior to it (36). >aspect of *mystery* was strongly felt by Augustine
12) < > **Aquinas** tried to state the theory of divine ideas to free it from anthropomorhism, and **Ockham** rejected it (gave an interpretation that amounted to rejection)
" gave a minimizing interpretation to the theory of divine illumination.
Duns Scotus rejected both divine ideas and divine illumination.(37)
13) *Confessiones* as an impressive example of philosophizing in a theological context. E.g. it shows the nonsensicality of the question what God was doing before creation (creation implies °time, so you can't talk about a 'before', without 'tim' there was no 'then') (39)
14) Augustine's discussion of time shows his ability as a thinker (cf. B. Russell) (40)
15) Augustine distinguishes between the spoken word , its meaning as grasped by the mind, the use of a word as a sign for itself, and its use as singnifying or standing for an object or objects. (41)
16) (View of man) Obviously Platonic theory: man as 'a rational soul using a moral and earthly body'. He maintains that man is a unity and not a juxtaposition of substances. The body is an occasion for sensation , an instrument by which the soul is in touch with other material things.(42)
17) **A master of self-analysis, with an acute perception of both the grandeur and the misery and**
18) **weakness of man, viewed from a religious perspective. (43)**
Was convinced that history - from creation until the final completion of the City of Jerusalem (47) - had a goal (teleological process) (< > Plotinus)
19) State= essentially coercive and punitive *qua* functions, becessary because of the Fall
< > Aquinas: a 'natural' institution, demanded by man's nature and social needs as such (45)

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end of lecture 2
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[7] =An illumination enabling us to see eternal truths and to judge of things in relation to eternal standards or ideas.

Lecture 3: Augustine on Insight and Illumination

De Magistro (388-89 AD) "The Teacher" written after conversion to Christianity; dialogue with his son Adeodatus. At the end of his life, Augustine wrote a book *Retractiones* (reconsiderations), telling that there is **no teacher giving knowledge to man but God**.
You don't learn anything by signs called words. You can't teach through words. Words can't convey truth/ knowledge. Augustine uses a strong notion of truth: something is X and X=true.
A teacher at best can *help* you to find the truth, point the way, the understanding has to be in the student.

The Teacher is about insight. Augustine denies that teaching using signs, especially words, areuncapable of generating insight. Insight requires a personal experience. The model of teaching Augustine works with is transferring of knowledge: knowledge -> words (spoken/written) ---> retranslated (decoded) back into words -> knowledge.
Language is insufficient to do this kind of conveying, language *can* be used to transfer some information, but with language you can't make person x understand something. The understanding /insight is in the student, not in the transfer. There is a gap between two minds that cannot be bridged by language.

> the book is on language and thus signs (semiotics, the philosophical discipline dealing with signs always preoccupied Augustine)
(quotation on *Christian Doctrine*)
Sign = a thing that out of itself causes something else to enter into thought beyond the appearance that it presents to the senses
e.g. non-smoking sign

Some signs can only be used for the sake of signifying (e.g. worlds)
[Things, some of which are signs, soem of which can only signify (words, linguistic signs)]
- All signs are things
- Not all things are signs, lots of things are just things (cigare, regular tree)

Sign - Signifying relation - Significant

Some things are only used to signify something else: words (e.g. 'DOG')

Adeodatus says speaking is either about teaching or speaking > relationship between language and learning
> Augustine: through the use of linguistic signs, no one can teach anyone anything that is true, in such a way that they know it's true, in such a way that they iunderstand it. Knowledge/truth transfer through language isn't possible because of knowledge gap. >> language is an insufficient carrier / conveying device to deliver knowledge from one person to another.

First part of dialogue is long and complex with dubious language philosophy, but states that "signs can lead you to knowledge of other signs" (e.g. signs in two different languages > dictionary). Once you got the meaning of one word, you can easily get the meaning of another word.
Conclusion of first part: signs can be shown through other signs.
Augstine's stronger point: language is a closed system. How do you know what 'name' means? How did you learn the first word? How to make this first connection between reality and language? How to bridge the gap? A: Language can't help you with that!

Second part of dialogue (read in class).
2.a) Can anything be shown without signs? Are signs a <u>necessary condition</u> for showing things?
> Adeodatus: Yes! (walking example)
<> Aug.: No! there are some things *some people*[8] understand without signs.
There are B, things that exhibit themselves!
-> *Birdcatcher example* (= turning point in the dialog)
(doesn't really answer Aedatus example of walking, but let's give him the point)

2.b) (even stronger claim) Are signs a <u>sufficient condition</u> for showing things?
> Aug: No, no thing can be shown by signs.

"Nothing is learnt through a sign, when a sign is given to me it teaches nothing if it finds me ignorant of the thing of which it is a sign, but if I'm not ignorant, what do I learn *through* the sign?"

= the *semantic*[9] version of the **Meno-paradox** (Plato) (= paradox about inquiry): if you knew what you were looking for, you wouldn't have to inquire, but if you don't know what you're looking for, you wouldn't even recognize the answer if you bumped into it.
Cf. *theory of recollection*(TOR): when souls in contact with the forms before entering our body, we had direct contact, direct acquaintance, knowledge. (Slave-boy and Pyhagoras)

Augustine is against TOR, beacuse otherwise everybody would be a geometrist.

Only through first-hand knowledge you get knowledge, through self-exhibiting things.

!A sign can't mean anything to you unless you already know the significant!

How you get the right anwer? > an 'aha-Erlebnis' The infant has to make the connection, it's an internal event. The sign plays a role, but the child/student will have to understand via reason that puts things together.

It's Christ The Teacher who brings the connections together within us (= illumination) (modern philosophy would call it 'insight')!

Augustine originality: language itself cannot bridge the gap between language and reality

-> *Sarabarae example* (Augustine shows that in at least one case, there has to be something more - direct access - than a sign // selntic version of Meno-paradox)
I learned that it was a sign when I found out of what thing it *is* the sign. Therefore the sign is learned when the thing is known less than the thing is known when the sign is given. A word only has meaning when you already know its significant.

Even an ostensive definition is the equivalent of a sign and therefor useless to transfer knowledge.
> Augustine is **ruling-out any language-exit-strategy**[10]: in order to make the first connection language-reality, you have to have that aha-moment, that illumination. Knowledge of words is complete only is made complete once the things are known.

Lots of self-exhibiting items are sensoral (sun, moon, ...). *Quid* intellectual examples of first-hand knowledge? This is a problem to Augustine.
Cf. 137. 10.35 > it's YOU who makes the connection between words and reality, there always has to be a flash of insight. I'm the one who makes the link, but I have to *know* reality first!

Importance: modern philosophy of mind (Wittgenstein) use Augustine as a wipping boy. They state that learning is rule-based <> John Searle : Chinese room experiment as Wittgensteinian idea of understanding.
Aug. there has to be an event of understanding, 'illumination' (i.e.flash of insight whereby you know what to do).

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[8] Who have something to seize up. E.g. *Good Will Hunting*, *Amedeus*.
Some human beings can understand some things without words. Just by watching the birdcatcher, the genius will grasp it.

[9] It hasn't to do with inquiry but with meaning: if the sign doesn't mean anything to me, it's useless, and if I already had the meaning, than I wouldn't be useful either.

[10] Languaghe is a closed system, tere is a real gap between reality and language, from words we learn only words, Words can't help us to get to their significants. At best they can tell us where to look. >> ~~knowledge tranfer model~~ We have to have first-hand knowledge.

Three consequences of Augustine's position:

a) **The understanding is in the student**, the internal test of truth: there has to be something in you
The most the words can do is to *guide*

b) **The relationship between sense-perception and intellectual cognition**: goes back to first-hand knowledge
> cf. the birdcatcher example / self-exhibiting items (an infinite number of them)
> Aug. wants to move the perceptional first-hand knowledge to the intellectual plane: first-hand *intellectual* knowledge

Parallellism: just like with the birdcatching, where you get first-hand knowledge, you're going to get first-hand knowledge of the truth of the proof, but you're observing > parallelism between sense-knowledge and intellectual knowledge --> it's the inner light of truth that is the first-hand knowledge that's equivalent to sensory perception!
Just as you have to see the Sarabarae before understanding what's it about, you have to see the truth in this inner light: it is you judging the truth, making the connections.

How does Aug. go from the sensory to the intellectual example?

c) Don't words do anything?
> Words have force only to the extent that they remind us to look for things, teacher prompt us, giove us a reason to consult our inner truth, use your own intellect to get understanding!

Quid the Bible?
> Augustine admits that the Bible doesn't bring us to knowledge as such.

Makes draws an interresting distinction

Propositional belief - knowledge	**Propositional knowledge knowledge**
Words can lead to belief but without first-hand experience of what is described, you won't have knowledge	By first hand experience

I believe what I know/understand, but I don't know/understand what I believe.
Belief is useful, is a good thing.

Everything we *know,* we also believe, but we have beliefs that are much more extensive than things that we actually know, things that we can test with that inner test of truth or things that we've seen: e.g. biblical stories.µ

> Augustine is forced to make this disticntion (belief-knowledge) in order to preserve the Bible from being reconsidered a s just another set of words. Words *can* lead to belief! They *can't* lead to knowledge, but I can still believe them depending on the authority of the one who gave them to me (revelation etc.). >> Belief is useful, is a good thing even though it's not knowledge.

Wrap-up: John Searle's example (squiggels > man with dictionary > squaggels) against strong artificial intelligence[11]

Augustine offers a way of showing / understanding what the diffference is between strong AI and humans:
> no amount of rules are gonna make you get it; you can write down rules until you turn blue, but that isn't enough, you have to *understand* something, that's the test of truth, that's the inner event! Understanding is in the one who is doing the understanding!

"Unless you believe, you shall not understand; Without belief you have no basis for understanding" (*Credo ut intelligam*)

[11] The idea that computers could be made to understand the way humans do.

Lecture 4: Anselm, the Father of Scholasticism, on Truth

- °1033 +1109 (before the era of the universities) an abbot, writing dialogues for his monks (comfortable evironment)
- part of the Augustinian tradition;
- He *does* map out solid arguments contrary to Augustinus
- famous for his ontological proof of the existence of God;
- his motto: *fides quarens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding);

> discussion about the meaning:

- he *doesn't* mean that faith is efficient, that you can substitute faith for knowledge
- neither he means that only Christians could understand (<> ontological proof was designed to convince non-believers)
- he *does* mean that belief is a motivator, motivates you to go further with your knowledge, deepen it

> Anselm wants to give *necessary reasons* for the Trinity whereas those were given only through revelation >> confidence in reason

- *Dialogue on Truth* (1080-1086); God is a major part of Anwelm's philosophical work

p. 3: We believe that God is Truth
// Augustine: "God is True" (*De Magistro*)
Anselm: How does the truth in things relate to *the* Truth (God)? (= key-issue of the dialogue)
-> begins with the **study of different kinds of truth**

a) The truth found in statements (propositions, assertions) (e.g. "I ate dry tomatoes yesterday")

When is a statement true? Student (p.4): when what the statement states either by affirming/denying is the case, when a statement signifies that what-is is >> *correspondance theory of truth*[12]
There has to be a relationship to reality, that is eather satisfied or not!
[There are other theories: coherence ~ (coherency with other propositions as a criterion (either consistency or entailment); teleological ~ (explanation of phenomena by appeal in whole or in part to*purpose* or *goal* (telos). What is it for? How is it caused?]

Reasoning: when it signifies what-is is then it is correct, then it is true, truth is nothing other than correctness, than rectitide.
"For what purpose is an affirmation made[13]?"
Anselm talks about the Purpose of statements, of what they ought to be used for. God gave a goal to affirmative statements. Lying is an abuse of affirmative statements.
Anselm gets down - through substitution (cf. reasoning) to the fact that when an affirmative statements signifies what is is, its signification is both *correct* and *true* . Then he makes an equivalency between correctness and that truth, stating that *truth is rectitude.*

Anselm wants to state that affirmative statemenst are made to signify what is is (they have an 'ought'); rectitide is about statements *doing their job*(doing what they ought to do), which he calls correctness. So truth is a form of correctness or correctness[14]. >> *Teleological notion of truth* (statements are made for something, for doing their job, and only insofar as they do this job, they are true).

Truth of statements has to do with what they are made to do: signifying what is is (truth = rectitide).

Consequence:
> affirmative statement is true when it signifies what is is, makes a statement true (= correspondance aspect)
> *quid* false statements (i.e. lack of correspondance)? Aren't they doing what they were made for?

Anselm: a statement has recieved the power to signify what is is, but also to signify what is not is otherwise lies wouldn't be possible > there has to be some kind of room for statements to be false, statements have to be able to signify falsely; without the ability to be false, it wouldn't be able to be true either

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[12] Statements, at least in the past and present tense, are true if they correspond to reality, to states of affairs, to an event. Really old theories: cf. Aristotle (*Metaphysics*): "To say of what is that it is not, or vice versa, is false". Still the most popular today.

[13] Anselm means 'created' (by God)

[14] If you buy the idea yhat statemenst have an 'ought' / a 'job' / a 'purpose'.

e.g. "Clinton is the president of the USA" in 1989: false; in 1993: true; 1998: true: 2000: false

Anselm's point: contingent statements *have* to be able to be both true and false. most statements made can be true but also be false (Bill Clinton example)!

Crux: **2 different kinds of truth/ rectitude** as a result of the combination of 2 views on truth:

A. *Correspondance* theory (view)	**B. *Teleological* theory (view)**
(Un)true in virtue of a relation with reality, satisfied (or not) Stating what is is , or what is not is	Explanation of phenomena by appeal in whole or in part to *purpose* or *goal* (telos). What is it for? How is it caused? Does it do what is it made for (its job, it's 'ought')
Strong truth	*Weak* truth = merely teleological (all statements have this kind)
Doing to the fullest extent what they're made for (i.e. also corresponding)	Just the basic fact that a statementy kan signify, can give meaning > all statements have this power (since made by God)

False statements, according to the corresponding theory, only have weak truth, because tehy're signifying something ("doing their job), but not signifying reality as it *is*.
Truth in a teleological sens is weak beacuse it's enough to signify, correspondance isn't taken into account.
Truth in a correspondance view is strong because they're doing to the fullest extent what tehy are mada (i.e. created) for: signifying what is , is, and what is not, is not.
What we would call *true statements* have, in the way Anselm looks at it, both strong truth (signifying what is is) and weak truth (signifying *tout court*); correspondance *and* telos, whereby A entails B but not vice versa;

In some statements (the so-called "necessary statements", like 'human beings are animals') weak and strong truth aren't separable.

Wrap-up: Anselm holds a type of correpondance theory of truth, but he modifies it because he has a teleological notion of truth - i.e. truth is a rectitude, statements fulfilling their purpose, statements are *supposed* to signify that what is is por what is not is not - but even statements that don't do this, hence that are false from a corrspondance view, nevertheless do their job in one sense, by giving a meaning > hence: distinction strong versus weak truth.
>*Weak truth* is fulfilling the minimal purpose that statements have: signifying reality. All (factual) statements posess this weak form of truth.
<>Strong truth is available when statements are *really*, to the fullest extent, doing what they were made for by God: i.e. to signify what is is, and what is not is not.

True statements, according to Anselm, will have both *weak* truth and strong truth: they *signify* what is is.
False statements only have weak truth: signifying something, but not reality as it is.
Even false statements have truth (cf. teleological notion: statements are always doing a job), because of the mere fact that they are statements.

Either statements correspond or the don't = Anselm's view.

The weak element is that any factual statement has weak truth because it's *able* to signify reality. e. g. "Obama is president of the USA" -> in 12 years this statement will be false, and it will only have weak truth; it gets the strong truth out of its correspondance with reality as it is.

In a necessary proposition, the statement always has both truths.

Anselm has to hold this view otherwise he'd have to say that false statements don't mean anything at all. False statements are doing what they're supposed to do, only not to the fullest extent.
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b) Truth of opinions

= preceisely parallel to the truth of the propositions

c) Truth of the will

Idem. Our will is made not to sin, the will is true when it's not sinning.

"God is the Supreme Truth" means two things according to Anselm:
1) It's God that made statements to have the purpose/job/teleology to signify what is is.
2) God makes the conditions whereby statements are true. things exist in the past because that's the way it is in the Supreme Truth.

e.g. modern example "snow is white" > a) God gave that statement to be true, to signify what is is (the purpose it has) (=weak truth)
b) God also made snow white, so that the statement is true, and that comes from the Supreme Truth.

Supreme Truth cannot have a beginning or end. If it is true to say that 'Obama is president in 2010' the cause of it being true must have existed.
It's not possible that truth pre-existed truth or that truth post-existed truth, therefor truth must always have existed.

- Several problems / objections:
a) How do you know about the 'ought'?
b) A statements which signify that what is is, are both true *and* correct according to Anselm.
<> it's not beacuse to two things are coextensive that they are the same (<> Anselm identifies them)

[Anselm knows that contingent propositions have to go back en forth between truth and falsness]
> give him his premisses and see what comes out, it's a rational line of argumentation >> hence: Father of Scholasticism
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end of lecture

Lecture 5: Peter Abelard on Ethics

- Rockstar of the XIIth Century at the time of the 'wandering scholars' (before the foundation of universities), a super scholar, super popular.
- *The History of my Misfortunes / Historiae calamitatum* (autobiography)
- *Stealing heaven* (movie)
- Abelard & Heloïse
  > extremely sharp, influential woman > check her letters with Abelard
- Major philosophical mind!
  > at Copleston's days: Abelard best at saying what was wrong with other people's theories
  > over last 30 years major research: he *was* a an extraordinarily gifted debater, but he was also a creative mind, with major philosophical contibutions in metaphysics, natural philosophy, epistemology and ethics
  > considered to be the best logician of the Middle Ages
- Scholarly argument around Helo¨se's influence on Abelard's ethics. Anyhow, it's probably the only case in the history of philosophy were a woman might have had some influence on a philosophical doctor

- Ethics of intention! *Know Yourself* (= his treatise on ethics)
- (Friedman) Should be a classic in ethics courses, because he offers a very different view of moraln theory than found among the three theories of today[15]:

  a) **Virtue ethics** - goes way back to the Greeks - (Abelard also brings it into play and uses the word virtue in a specific way + cf. W. Ockham): a virtue = character trait, a mental reflex that makes you do the right thing. When confronted with a situation where you need to be just, to act just (e.g. black jokes). Ethics depends on character, on who you are, and you build up who you are by acting that way. So by acting justly you become more inclined to act justly.

  b) **Deontological ethics** - goes back to Kant > kantian ethics - the only virtue is doing your duty. the really big decisions on how to behave are dictated by the categorical imperative > 'oughts' built in rationality

  c) **Consequentialism** - Bentham and Mill - the only thing that count is the *result* and the key question is whether the results maximize hapiness.
  > Abelard says objects radically: how can you judge on the basic of what happens afterwards, it has to depend on the *intention* with which you pursue the particular action.

- Abelard's key question: where - at what point - in the process of coming into action (desire > action > evt. consequences), should be judged on the moral quality of an action?
Only the intention with which the action is done should be taken into account when evaluating it (= before the action)

- Morals = a mind's vices or virtues that make us disposed to bad or good deeds.
Ethics is about the *mind* and he rules out 'morally irrelevant factors' such as having a good memory, they don't matter morally.
E.g. hot temperedness (the soul being easily inclined to anger) inclines you to behave in a way you should not to, it's your nature, it's something whether your in you wether you're in the situation or not.

	Abelard	**Aristotle / Aquinas**
p. 5	(Also) the body's construction has an effect on the way you're inclined to act, on your vices and virtues.	/
	Hero Theory of Ethics: the struggle counts, it helps you	A perfectly virtous person is struggle-free, simply behaves virtuously, slide into the way they should act

The mere fact that we're inclined, disposed, to do evil things, dosn't make us sinners. On the contrary! The fact that we are resisted and that we resist this temptation, makes us a hero: it's better to struggle and win, than to very easily, without any effort, do the good thing.

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[15] Virtue ethics - goes way back to the Greeks - (Abelard also brings it into play and uses the word virtue in a specific way + cf. W. Ockham): a virtue = character trait, a mental reflex that makes you do the right thing. When confronted with a situation where you need to be just, to act just (e.g. black jokes). Ethics depends on character, on who you are, and you build up who you are by acting that way. So by acting justly you become more inclined to act justly.

= **Hero Theory of Ethics**: it's actually a good thing that we're tempted to do bad things because if we resist, it's a victory for us, we gain something out of that struggle (virtue of moderation > victory is more glorious the more difficult it is)

- To sin = to **scorn the creator** = not to give up/renounce for God's sake what we ought to renounce for his sake

- At what point do you decide that a sin has been committed?

Anselm of Canterbury	**Peter Abelard**
"All sin is voluntary" > To will a good deed makes it good > To will a bad deed makes it bad Willing / desire is the moment to judge Driving means you *want* to pollute	<> Thinks 'willing / desire' is to broad a category to employ in moral evaluation. It's useless to say that all sinning is voluntary because <u>not all sin is voluntary</u>, sometimes we sin without any bad will (slave and the master: slave chased by master and kills the master against his will he did what was needed to preserve his life). // driving but *not* wanting to pollute, nevertheless you pollute: you *tolerate* polluting but it's not part of your willing. The slave tolerated to kill his master, he *consented* to it. He shouldn't have killed according to Abelard. Cf. drivers don't want to pollute, they want to drive, but nevertheless consent to it.

You should judge the action at the moment of consent = moment when you fully intend to commit the act.

E.g. p. 9 § 42: As long as you're just enjoying natural - God created this - desire (member of a religious order tied to a bed with women around) without consent, it's no sinning.
§49: Sleeping somehow decieved with a woman who he thoughts was his wife

The will / desire (eg pleasure tempts the monk), but if the temptation is struggled and the consent isn't given, than it's ok. Pleasure and temptation is natural, somethings that comes from the body on its own. It's even good, because it gives you material for a fight that you have to resist!

Invincible ignorance (hy-unter in the woods who accidentally shoots someone) prevents the sin.

The eyes of God vs. the Law
e.g. Mother that smothers her baby: it was an honest mistake done out of ignorance or force, nevertheless she'll be punished to show the people that you have to be careful.

Consent = (p. 7, §29) **really strong form of willing**, is *action-directing willing*, to give in to what isn't allowed and not drawing back from committing it and being wholly ready to carry it out should the opportunity arise. Once the consent is given, the action is going to take place, **you committed yourself fully to carry out the action!** Only external events may prevent the act from being fully carried out.

How can Abelard say that the slave committed a sin without the slave wanting to kill his master? Abelard says, we should look for the moment of consent [bad consent without a bad will = slave killing the master]

The voluntary	**The consensual**
Too broad, just 'wanting/desiring' something	Very specific/strong form of willing 'point of no return', only external force will stop the at from being committed.

- the intention is measured at the moment of consent
- the will preceding the consent << CONSENT << the action + its consequences;
The consent belongs to the soul and is the only things that counts
Any kind of carrying out the intention is irrelevant.

What is it that makes our acts morally praisable,...?
Common sense way: look at the consequences!
<> Abelard: deeds/acts are morally indifferent / neutral, because equally common to reprobates and to the elect

cannot determine the (im)morality of the act
e.g sexual intercourse among married and unmarried people

Cf. moral luck (Bernard Williams: 'moral luck'): 2 people fully intend to build houses for the poor, but one gets unlucky (mugged violently) > this luck is irrelevant because it's out of their control.
> having a lot of money to give would make someone morally more valuable than someone without money (= sheer craziness)

You fully intend / consent to get money for an orphanage, but you get mugged on the way back from the bank. Since the intention on the moment of consent counts, the moral (bad) luck afterwards has no impact and the deed itself either. It's the intention to which you consented!

>Human judges have to make do with looking at deeds > justice on earth is necesserily flawed. God's justice will get you the right answer.

Abelards gives a good system, gives reasons for them. Practical problem: the necessarily flawed human justice
Sandwich: he painted a picture from our process of coming to action. It's the intention at our point of consent (i.e. the action-driving willing) that's the determinate of the moral worth of our action.
Cf. handout:
nr. 1: "even if the same thing is done by the same person different times, because of the diversity of intention, the act is sometimes bad and sometimes good"
nr. 2: "if the intention is right, the whole mass of deads arising from it will be worthy of light"

Two criteria for good deeds:
a) You actually believe that it's what God wants (<> sin= scorn for god: not doing what we ought to for God's sake / doing what he doesn't want us to do);
b) To be right about what God wants
> if the intention is right, you're safe!

- general willing / desire / temptation has no moral worth (munk tied to soft bed with women)

- the deed / consequence has no moral worth (e.g. sex by (un)married couples)

- intention at the point of consent (the action-driving will) is crucial / determinate

"Do your deed with charity, and you're ok"

Problems for and objections to Abelard:
a) It's **a God-based theory**
> he assumes that there is access to the intention (only God can see that)
> here on earth no direct action to people's intentions >> practical problem
<> consequentialists *have* access to the acts, *can* determine wether lots of people are(n't) made happy
b) *Quid* **multi-intentional actions**?
> why not going to church both for the love of God and to be seen by fellow citizens (simplistic on a psychological level)
> genuine interest of a politician in the problems of his constituency but thinking at the same time how good it would be to be seen helping poeople by the media (re-election).
c) How about the **circumstances surrounding the act?**
<> possible answer of Abelard: it forms part of the intentionality

[Hate-crime legislation goes into the direction of what Abelard is contending (more emphasis on the intention]

Good points made by Abelard:
a) The nature of willing
b) Whether willing and bad deeds are related directly to one another
Copleston on Anselm:
1) One of those 'great man' (Hegel) who were convinced that the attempt to understand was essential for the development of faith (*credo ut intelligam* // Augustinus) (72)
2) General programme of 'Faith seeking understanding'
3) Series of proofs of God's existence from degrees of perfection (the *Monologium)* (< > Augustinus) (73)
4) Most famous argument ('ontological argument') in the *Proslogium* (74):
If God is absolute perfection, as that than which no greater can be thought, he must exist objectively (because what exists objectively is greater than what exists only in the mind). > divine attributes like omnipotence and infinity (75)

< > rejected by AQUINAS, who argued that we lack the positive insigt into the divine nature which would be required for arguing from God's possibility to his actuality. We cannot see that 'God exists' is necessarily true by mere analysis of the proposition . It constitutes *an illicit transition from the conceptual to the existential order (192)*. The divine essence in itself trenscends the grasp of human mind, we cannot say what the divine essence is in itself.(196-97). So e.g. terms as 'wise' when predicated of God, are used neither univocally or equivocally, but analogically (196)
< > KANT also rejected it, however it was being reconsidered bij Malcolm and Hartshorne (God's existence is either logically necessary or logically impossible and since it has not been shown logically impossible, it must be logically necessary) (76)
5) His controversy with GAUNILI shows a level of sophistication we wouldn't expect of the 11th century as generally depicted and Anselm's distinction between the grammatical and the logical form of a proposition;
6) Distinguishes between meaning (*significatio*) and reference (*appellatio*).

Copleston on Abelard:

1) Studied under Roscelin and then under hyper-realist William of Champaux;
2) Universality is to be ascribed to words alone (nominalism) (82)
3) *Sic et Non* contributed to the development of the scholastic method of mentioning different opinions and the reasons given for them and attempting solutions of the problems raised (83);
4) In his ethical work *Scito teipsum* (Know Thyself) the emphasis is pleced on intention, acts being morally indifferent and only the intention placing them in the moral order, making them right or wrong. Sin consist essentially in a perverted will, in an interior act involving contempt or disregard for the divine will, the exterior act not adding anything. Sin is equated with contempt for the divine will, but there can be no culpability or sin when there is ignorance of the divine will. Emphasis on the intention and on the conscience as the subjective ethical norm (84)
5) He may have exaggerated the role of intention at the expense of other factors which should be borne in mind.

Aristotelian intermezzo (terminology)

> moving from an overall platonic view (= first half of the course, Augustine > Anselm, pretty much everybody in this era was influenced by Plato's view on the soul // Christianity (soul detached from the body, and its immortality) + idea on the forms (// Christianity: forms could be considered as God's ideas)

From the XIIth C. we move to Aristoteliansm (not very available before cf. Plato's Timaeus). Boethius had translated some works on Aristotle and wished to translate all his work in order to reconcile Plato and Aristotle (grand scheme). Boethius died after translating 4 works on Aristotle's logic (they were the only ones that were available).

Background: big economic boom, people travellig, studying, translation activity (1150-1160), most works of Aristotle were recovered, also thanks to William van Moerbeke (one of the great translators of the Middle Ages (contemporary of Aquinas).

Complex question to know through which languages we got to Aristotle (Arab, Greek).

Wiliam van Moerbeke did so-called 'critical text edition' (comparing manuscripts to get as close as possible to the original text). Crux: by mid 23th century:

- Most of Aristotelian work available through translations;
- Universities established as officially institutions (University= oldest guild activities, masters and students) > even greater need for translations;
- Rise of mendican orders (Fransiscans (Scotus and Ockham) / Dominicans (e.g. Aquinas) became major figures in theology.

>> explosion / growth of knowledge in the XIIIth Cent. and Aristotelian fits in very well

1050: a few words of Aristotle's logic and some Plato (Timaeus + works by other, platonically influenced thinkers)

1250: nearly ball of Aristotle's works, an entire system of philosophy (logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics, cosmology and theology).

>> a whole world opens up >> excitement because of new work: how does it work with Christian beliefs, how does it work with older beliefs (Platonism), ... That's why we need to get to Aristotelianism

Highlights (terms and concepts):

Aristotelianism is not necessarily Aristotle!

Aristotle	Aristotelianism
	= Aristotle as read and interpreted by Greek, Muslim, Jewish and Latin tradition

Aristotle fits really well in the Greek tradition that wanted to explain change (= one of the main things that Aristotle wanted to explain). He wanted to give a convincing analysis.

E.g. Socrates goes to South Africa and comes back tanned, what happened?
Three elements:
a) Socrates persists throughout the change
b) Characteristic before change = not-brownness
c) Characteristic after change = brownness

- This analysis guides Aristotle in his *general analysis of change*: in every change you have three features:
  a) enduring/persisting subject (what remains the same throughout the change = **matter**[16])
     in casu: Socrates
  b) **Privation**[17] (what is actually missing but that nevertheless the matter can have)
     In casu: Socrates' not being brown)
  c) **Potentiality** (indicates the genuine possibility under the right circumstances the matter has in becoming something else in actuality[18])
     In casu: brownness
  d) The characteristic that the matter actually gains through this change, as a result of the change, is the **form**[19] (*in casu* the form of brownness; the form indicating the actuality of brownness)

Platonic Forms	**Aristotelian Forms**
Separate from the sensual world, off there in the intelligible world.	Are *in* the things we see down here.

Before the change, Socrates had a privation of brownness, no actual form of brownness, but he had a potentiality to become brown, to take down the form.
After the change, Socrates actually has the form.
Before the change, S. was potentially brown (= having a real possibility to become brown)

// How to learn a language?
Student = matter (what endures throughout the change)
Student *not knowing the language* = privation, but there is a genuine possibility to acquire the knowledge
Student knowing the language = having gained the form of knowing language, having actualised his potentiality.

>> potentiality – actuality distinction is a nice model to explain change, extremely powerful and attractive for Medieval thinkers (Latin, Greek, Jewish, Muslim)

e) **Accidental change:** deals with changethat happens to independently existing things like a human being learning a language, a stone turning into a statue, ... **Accidents** are characteristics that exist in something else and could come and go fairly easily without destroying the matter of which they are the accidents. E.g. brownness. Certain characteristics that don't go to the core of the things, like e.g. being two meters hight, being in the train station, ... (= changeable easily without changing the core, the matter, what's undergoing the change). Accidents comes to be from the privation of that accidents.

Aristotle says there are 10 kind of things in which you can divide the world up (categories), 9 of which are accidents (quantity, *quality*, *relation*, action, passion, place, time, posture/position, state/habit) and the 10th is substance (2 kinds

color *parenthood*

In case of accidental change, the matter comes into a form where it wasn't before (e.g. brown)

Another kind of change =

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[16] Persisting subject through change, what endures (Greek: *hylè)*

[17] A lacking characteristic that the matter subsequently can gain.

[18] Potentiality and actuality are corresponding opposites: you only have potentiality when the actuality is genuinely possible)

[19] What makes the matter actually have the characteristic that it gains in any particular change. That in virtue of which the subject has the characteristic it has.

Substance	Accidents
First Substance (e.g. an *individual* cow, human) = something that exists on its own and that undergoes accidents Second substances (= human being, cow)	

A first substance coming into being = generation
A first substance passing away = corruption

Generation and corruption are substantial change
Substantial change works parallel, just like accidental change > there has to be:

a) a matter (an enduring subject, what endures to change);
b) a privation of the form that will be gone through the substantial change (and the corresponding potentiality);
c) the presence of the form that's taken on after the substantial change

First condition (there has to be something that stays the same throughout the change):

- there has to be a most basic type of matter, a matter that has no form: *prime matter*[20]

Accidental change (change on an accidental level)	Substantial change (change on a substantial level)
1) An enduring subject to change (matter) White *Socrates* > Brown *Socrates* 2) 3)	1) An enduring subject through substantial change (prime matter) Prime matter > Socrates (if Socrates dies, the prime matter loses the substantial form, the form of S) 2) Privation (the lack of the missing form potentiality) 3) Act uality (the gaining of the missing form)

Matter is a relative term: >in a substantial change, your matter is *prime matter*
>in accidental change, your matter is already something that has already prime matter as a matter

Matter is whatever is the enduring subject of the change in question, whether it's a substantial or an accidental change. What the matter is in a particular change varies: when S comes into being, the matter is prime matter, when S gets tanned, the matter is S, ...
Every thing (prime substance) in this world is made up of form and matter (> **hylèmorphism**)
Prime matter has no form, but every single cow, human being, tree, has a substantial form that moulds mater into the thing it is.
You'll never see a lump of prime matter (here on earth because prime matter is pure potentiality, it needs some form to give it (any) actuality. The matter that undergoes substantial change.
Big discussion in MA about whether it's even possible for a thing with no actuality of its own to exist:

Does pure potentiality exist?

A thing without any actuality *cannot* exist	**A thing without any actuality *can* exist**
Scotus and Ockham PM exists, we need it to explain change, but it has a little bit of actuality of its own, so it would have to be God to put a lump of PM on this desk. God could make it happen. Scotus says that PM has enough actuality that God would create it as just PM.	Aquinas: but not even God could create a lump of PM and put it on this desk. PM oly exists as part of a hylomorphic composite of formal matters.

What is the metaphysical make-up of existing particulars, what is it that makes you you? It's gonna be some kind of matter and some kind of form in a specific relation...

Prime matter > takes on substantial form > takes on accidental form

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[20] The most basic type of matter, having no form, that is the matter that stays the same through substantial change. [PM, without any form, is pure privation > can pure privation exist? PM is pure potentiality…]

e. g. Prime matter >> can take on elementary form >> become's an element (earth)
= new matter

Form and matter go into any explanation that A wants to give on what a thing is.
In any explanation he'll appeal to matter and form.

There are in fact 4 causes that A discusses:

a) **Material cause** (= matter) >**bricks**
b) Formal cause (what makes it have the function/shape that it has?) >**configuration of the bricks**
c) **Efficient cause** (what makes it have that function/shape) e.g. sculptor >**bricklayer**
d) **Final cause** (why is it made, what's the end or the goal?) >**for people to live in**
= the final, but at the same time determining, most important: first this should be questioned, then the material, the procedure,...

Only when these four causes are discussed, you've given an exhaustive description of the causal make-up.

Text fragment: A argues that there was no first change ("motion") that change is endless, first change is a *contradictio in terminis*.
> locomotion (change of place), Galileo turned motion into just locomotion for most modern thinkers)
> alteration, kind of motion/change when qualities change: Socrates gaining 10 kilos
> substantial motion: S coming into being

"Motion is the actualisation of the movable insofar as it is movable"
Socrates getting a tan is the actualisation of S insofar as S is tannable (being able to tan). The change is from S being able to get a tan to actually being tanned.

No matter how you want to take it, there cannot have been a change before which there was no change, no matter how far back you go, there'"s gonna be a change before the change because, by definition, Change requires an enduring subject! Also substantial change (PM).

- Problematic from the standpoint of *divine creation* (Christian faith). How make these two things agree?

Copleston:

Lecture 6 Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and Evil

- (1225-1274) Leading medieval thinker!
- Thougt in terms of an overall Chritian vision off reality, enriched by thet thought of men who had worked without the Christian faith (327);
- The official Doctor of the Dominican order (***C*** 230);
- To him, Aristotle was 'the Philosopher', Aristotelianism represented philosophical truth (***Copleston*** 180)
- Distinguished between theology and philosophy (***C*** 181): taking faith as a strating point and explore its content and implications (> theologians, an appeal to authority constitutes the very weakest of arguments for philosophers (C 183) < > not presupposing faith but simply relying on human reasoning, employing principles based on an ordinary experience (> thinking as philosophers) (***C*** 182);
- Empiricist view: the mind's capacity for knowledge (being able to transcend the visible world once it has had experience), does not entail the conclusion that it starts its life with a stock of innate ideas or of inborn knowledge. the primary objects of human knowledge are material things (***C*** 184)
- All finite things, whether corporeal or spiritual, exemplify the basic distinction between essence and existence. This distinction is a basic form of the potentiality-act relation which is found in all finite things, thus not in God (pure act, changeless and undergoes no change or becoming) (essence//potentiality < > existence// act)(185-'86);
- Crux: He wishes to wombine a psychology based on Aristotle with belief in personal immortality (188), trying to have both things at once: insisting that the human being is one substance, not two, and yet maintain that the soul is a substance in its own right. (188)
- He also has to interpret Aristotelian ethics (good actions are those compatible with man's attainment of his final end, bad actions those incompatible with this attainment) in such a way as to leave it open to a Christian supernatural outlook. (189)
-
- Matter in itself, as pure potentiality cannot exist by itself, it having some 'demand' for quantity. >> he cannot accept the theory (adopted by e.g. Bonaventure) of hylomorphic composition in purely spiritual finite substances.(187)
- Hierarchic conception of the universe, ranging from matter as pure potentiality at the bottom up to God, who is pure act. (187).
- The soul (anima) is 'the first principle of life in living things about us', the thing's substantial form, the immanent constitutive principle which makes the thing the kind of thing it is. (187)

- The question whether the world did or did not have a beginning could not be answered by the philosopher (***C*** 182)
- How to reconcile Aristotle and Christian thought? Aquinas unfolds 5 arguments for a position he later rejects, namely 'nothing can be made by God to into be by way of creation' ('God can't create')
  = a version of Aristotle's argument

  Standard way of late-medieval argumentation in theology:
  a) Number of arguments in favour of the position which is later to be rejected
  b) Another look at things (there might be reasons to reconsider) > Genesis' quote
  c) Solution in which the author tells what he thinks
  d) Reply to each one of the arguments sub a)

Aquinas has to solve the situation in which, at one hand, he has Aristotle who says that there can be no creation and, on the other hand Genesis.

- He'll state that creation is just a different kind of thing than a change.
  If there weren't but changes, everything would be fine

Change	**Creation**
Where X goes from being A to being B, but x must have pre-existed, only the *form* changes Generation pre-supposes *prime matter*	**1) Giving a full being to being**, not just the form, but also the matter 2) It means **total dependency on the creator**. The causality (creator) extends to everything that's in the thing, because nothing uncreated pre-exists 1+2 are sufficient for the meaning of creation, for creation to be demonstrated.

Aquinas state's that Aristotle's argument is much stronger when it comes to the eternity of creation. This is where you have to go to the Bible because reason can't show us ths

Aquinas: Reason can show that there is in fact creation and God is the creator, but it can't show you that creation took place only 5000 years ago or a million years ago (it could be an infinite time ago in which case Aristotle's argument would hold, that there is no first change as such.

[Read only Aquinas' solution and response in the two questions I gave on Body & Soul]

"A soul is in virtue of which something is alive" If it has an anima / a soul, by definition it's alive.

ST I, q. 75, a 1: "In order to investigate the soul's nature, one must start by pointing out that the soul (*anima*) is said to be the first principle of life in the things that are alive around us. For we say that living things are animate, whereas inanimate things are those without life"

Aquinas is looking for a general definition of the soul, and it can't be limited to the human context: lots of living things don't make use of a heart, air,...
It has to be something that makes any living thing work together as a whole, e.g heart, lungs, brain have to work together, what's behind them, that has a priority.

First principle of life (=soul)	**Other principles of life**
What makes the organs in an organism work together en keep them running as a whole. What is behind all of your organs working together	

Human beings have a *rational* soul, because humans are capable of reasoning, we have intellect.
Animals have *sensory* souls, capable of sensing / perceiving things, and able to move itself. Sensory souls because have to be able to sense and to move.

- Some animals don't move (mussels etc.)

Plants have nutritive or *vegetative souls*, capable of take nourishment, grow, and reproduce

Higher soul takes in all the functions of a lower category. Sensory souls have the functionality of a nutritive part.

Big discussions in the MA on the relation between functions (we're not covering it)

What is the characteristic you can assign to human souls?

- Two big answers (from the later MA point of view):
  a) Plato (three quotations on handout – *Phaedo* en *Phaedrus*)
     Phaedo I) If we can attain true knowledge[21] with the body, it will be after death or because the soul is apart from the body. Plato's theory of the soul is directly linked to the theory of recollection: we get our true knowledge when we're separated from the body. The
     Phaedo II) The body gets in the way of knowledge, your senses can and do mislead you, you need to use reason to get around the deception. In order to reason best, you got to get separated from the body.

     Phaedrus : In this world we know we have true knowledge, because we can deal with language, with universals, etc. So I do have the kind of universal knowledge that – according to Plato *supra* – we can't get when our soul is attached to the body. >> the soul must be immortal and separable from the body. [doesn't just die with the body like other thinkers contend (epicurists)]
     = really attractive for Christians,
     Cf. Augustine : 4a)"If you want to define the soul for yourself and ask what the soul is, it's easy to reply ore it seems to be *a certain substance, partaking in reason and fitted to rule over the body*"
     'Substance'(= something that exists on its own, cf. Aristotle)
     (more clearly) 4 b) 'A human being is a rational soul *using* a mortal and earthly body'

     Augustine makes an extremely sharp distinction between soul and body. Augustine's notion proofs the success the Christian 'reception'.

[21] I.e. necessary, universal, immutable

< >Maybe Augustine looked at the body too negatively, the body after all equally being created by God.
'The body is the reason why we don't understand better than we do, so let's get rid of this' Augustine seems to fall in the view of Manicheims who considered the body (darkness) to be the cause of all evil.

Aquinas points out the question to know why God gave us a body in the first place...
Augustine would state that before the original sin, the bodies completely obeyed the reason.
We lost that ability. Nevertheless Augustine considered that the body is not even near as good as the soul.

Aquinas	**Plato**
(intuitin) Humans are rational animals with bodies; the body is something essential to us, to being a human being Otherwise the union of body &soul would be accidental and dead would not be a corruption (substantial change), but just an accidental change (<> counter intuitive) Link between soul and body in Platonic view is too loose, we need something tighter.	

Pro platonic view from a Christian standpoint	*Contra Platonic view from Christian standpoint*
Body & soul are separable	Why was the body created after all?
Soul is immortal	

Plato's theory of the soul	**Aristotle's theory of the soul**
- Soul & body are separable	Soul and body are inseparable Soul is the substantial form of a living creature ➢ It makes a living creature be what it is and thus they're inseparable, like wax(matter) and its shape (form) Hylèmorphism – every living being is composed of matter and form – a substantial form and its matter are inseparable. Aristotle is applying this theory to living creatures.
- Soul is immortal	- There might be a way of proving that a part of the soul exists apart (Aquinas is going to use this in order to get Plato back in there).

Aristotle rejects the question to whether the soul and the body are one as nonsensical: it's as little useful as to ask whether wax (matter) and its shape (form) are one / separable. If an eye would be the animal, sight would be its soul >> a blind eye is no more an eye than the eye of a statue, unless the eye can see it's not an eye.

Aquinas wants to know how far his analysis of just physical objects takes him – per analogiam - with living things. How far can he take hylèmorphism and apply it to soul & body? > *scientia de anima* as part of natural philosophy (Aristotle's work *De Anima* as part of Liberi naturalis)

If a Christian uses Aristotle's notion of a soul, he would gain the advantage that the soul and the body are intimately linked, but he's gonna have to adapt it because the soul has to be separate from the body (Christian belief > you have to bring Plato in it)

Aquinas is doing a balancing act, both arguing that the soul and the body are really tightly linked (an essential linkage that makes *one* human being), acknowledging that nevertheless the soul can leave the body. Crux: a lot of Aristotle and a little bit of Plato.

Aquinas (+1274 at the age of +- 50, rather fat), a rare philosophical genius, enormous works and every (sub-sub) section fits! He's got an architectonic vision of the way he thinks his philosophy needs to work.
He was a workhorse: 1268-1274: 4000 words a day for 4 years!

Classic structure of a medieval (scholastic) *quaestio*:

a) (18) opening or initial arguments
b) Some views that are supposed to serve as a yield-sign (*contra*)
c) His own point (response = authors own considered opinion)
d) Each one of the opposing, initial arguments is being replied to (responses to each of the initial arguments that *seemed* intelligent but now the author will tell why they weren't)

Aristoteles is recovered / translated (by Moerbeke i.a.) > Aquinas will be interested in the Aristotelian notion of the soul. He carries out a balancing act:

- on the one hand, wanting to show the body is not something accidental to the human being, human beings are essential bodies or their bodies are an essential part to them.
- on the other hand he has to aknowledge for the immortality of the soul: the soul is going to survivethe death of the body.

How does Aquinas does this? To distinguish with the soul being the form of the body (Aristotle) and at the same time an entity

p. 46 (response):

What is most properly an entity are *first substances* (individuals e.g. an individual person, tree, cow,...)

First substances	Second substances
What is most properly an **entity**; E.g. individual person, cow, tree Two characteristics / criteria ➢ subsistence (separate existence, can exist on its own) < > accidents are passive ➢ sharing fully in the nature of a species; you are *completely* human beings, animals, ... you have everything it takes to be a human being,...	Universals (there just definitions, would Aristotle say)

The soul doesn't fulfil both criteria and is therefore an entity in the unproper sense of the word.
Unproper entities are either universals or things (e.g. a hand) that are part of substances rather than fist substances: they don't share fully in the nature of a species, they don't belng to species nor to a genus except by reduction, they're sort of diminished substances. A chopped-off hand would subsist but wouldn't have any kind of substance or species or genus to it; in order to be hand in the proper sense, it must be somebody's hand, it has to play part in a body as a first substances. A hand is a substance by reduction, it has subsistence, but isn't in anyway complete. So it only fulfils one of the characteristics. It's the person that is a first substance.
// The soul: it can exist outside apart from the body, but it wouldn't be complete, it isn't a human being, it does n't fulfil what it requires to be a human being. Because human being have essentially a body.
Just as my hand is not a human being, my soul doesn't fulfil the requirements to be a human being, nevertheless it can subsist on its own.

Substances are things that are not in another as a subject. Accidents are substances in a way: my whiteness is in me as a subject.

The characteristic for the soul is, for Aquinas, its **incorruptibility** < > chopped-off hand is corruptible, will rot and disappear.
Both a chopped-off hand and the soul are entities in the improper sense of the term.

Aquinas has a big problem with the elements (fire,...) and is heavily criticised because his view forces him to admit that the only substances in the world are living creatures, because only they fulfil the two characteristics

- subsistence
- sharing fully in the nature of a species

The soul, giving meaning to the matter that is the body. Human beings are soul *and* body. How can Aquinas show that the body is a necessary part of the body and nevertheless the soul is separable from the body.

He does it through ***cognitive theory***: intellect is characteristic to the human being, a human being is a rational animal because of the possibility of rational thought. Looking at the intellect allows to see what we have to say about the rational soul in general.

p. 48, last §: from the way the intellect works, the mode of its existence can be known (= inductive, BN)

Let's look at what the rational soul does, and from there on, how it can exist.

- P. 45: a rational soul is the essential form of a human being, subsists per se because it operates per se, it's both an entity and a form.
  The intellect can operate separately from the body (i.e. thinking), you don't need the body to think
  On the other hand it needs the body to make thinking possible. Therefore a soul and a body should be linked.

  Medieval cognitive theory

  Everything in this world sends out species (photons) around, each of my external senses are affected by these species and they in turn send the received data further in the cognitive apparatus in my brain, send a representation to the common sense (= concept of Aristotle, assembles all of the related cognitive data (cf. milk is sweet and white)) that assembles a composite image and sends that on to the phantasia (imagination) where these images can be manipulated ('golden mountains') and it's also the place where the *phantasm* (last 'material' representation, like length, happiness). *Agent intellect* takes away the material aspect from the phantasm before it's called *intelligible species* (i.e. the intelligible content of what is in things only potentially in the world). E.g. trees are material objects, but have an intelligible core, a 'tree-ness', what allows me to talk about trees. It is this intelligible species where you get the essential nature of things out there.
  Cognitive process with The common sense makes composite images;
  the phantasia (imagination) can play with the images (gold mountains), and also makes the phantasm (i.e. the very final material representation) of which the remaining materiality is taken away by the agent intellect, like a bridge between the material and the immaterial world. After taking away the materiality, you're in the intelligible world.

  = **an empiricist view**: all the information you're gonna get will be through the senses, when you're born, you know nothing (according to Aristotle and Aquinas). Aquinas will use this to show that, on the one hand, intellect has an operation on its own for which it doesn't need the body and it can subsist a part – we know this from the way it operates (*per se*), and on the other hand, all of our knowledge begin with our senses, every time we do think, we need some sensory input and therefore we need the body.

  Pink vase with water, the water looks pink > if the intellect worked through some kind of bodily organ, it would skew your intellectual view of the world. So intellect works on its own.
  The intellect has a function on its own and the body doesn't share it. Therefore it exists. **From the way a thing operates you can tell how it exists. The intellect operates without the body, therefore it exists without the body.**

BUT: you can't think without your body helping you out! Every time you think, you have to anchor your thought in the last view of the thing that your intellect has. 2 indications (nr. 7)

1) Brain-damaged people (impaired cognitive faculties).
2) E.g. when you do a mathematical proof, you put it on paper, drawing a triangle etc., the fact that you need to turn to the image proves that you always have to look at the phantasm. (e.g. using examples to explain to people)

That's how Aquinas does the balancing act:

- The soul is the form of the body, since our intellect can't do what's most essential to it without vthe body, we always have to turn to the phantasm when we thik, that last material representation (2 indications);
- Thinking itself requires no body, nor bodily organ, thinking takes place without a body.

>> The body isn't thinking, but it is necessary for making thinking possible.

All this works off with Aquinas' (general)principle (GP) on the basis of which one can tell how a thing exists by the way it operates > the soul exists on its own because it can operate apart from the body.

A thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses those things necessary to the proper operation of its nature. The fulfilment of our nature is in knowing the truth and we cannot do that without a body feeding sensory images all the time.

The soul can subsist on its own (given operation separate from the body + GP) but it doesn't complete what a human being is, a human being needs the body in order to get the things to work with, it always has to go back to the phantasms.

Problems for this theory (does the balancing act work?)

- Your soul can survive your death, but your surviving soul is a substance isn't a human being, but you are a human being. You're a human being but your soul isn't. My soul is not me, but it is being punished for the things that I did as a living human being >> it's weird.
- It doesn't make any sense to say that the body isn't necessary for the intellect to think but the body is necessary to give the intellect the possibility of thinking.
  [The intellect can think without the body but in this life it never does; how could you prove this??]
  < > Scotus will state that we cannot prove that the soul is immortal, we can only try to give good reasons for it

The great divide is between:

Senses	**The intellect**
Deal with materiality, with particulars, with the here and now	Deals with the universal, the necessary, the immutable

Lecture 8: John Scotus and the medieval problem of universals and individuation

Copleston on Duns Scotus:
- Became known as the Subtle Doctor (213);
- One of the most able and acute thinkers Britain has produced: ability to discover fine distinctions and shades of
  meaning but also powerful at constructive systematization (213);
- Fransiscan, his fellows came to regard him as their principal Doctor and intelleuctual luminary, even if Bonaventure stood closer to St. Francis (229)
- the humand mind is capable of knowing all that is intelligible hence natural object = being as being (215)
- Accepts Aristotelian idea that the mind is a capacity to know without innate ideas or principles (216)
- Rejects the idea, dear to Bonavonture and most Fransiscans, that any special divine illumination is required for the attainment of certainty (215); His arguments against divine illuminations are directed against Henry of Ghent.

According to Professor Gilson (218)

Aquinas	**Scotus**
Focusses on existing things, is a true existentialist	We can study the attributes of being as such, he starts with an abstract concept (being as such) > looking forward to Hegel. If the object of the human mind is being in all its amplitude, then, if there's a God, it can be known by man. Before discussing whether there is a God, we must first know what we are talking about (have some concept of God) // modern philosophy

- God is the ground of possibility of there being a world (220)
- Infinity is the basic 'absolute' property of God, but not all divine attributes can be proved by philosophers (e/g/ omnipotence = matter of faith)
< > Aquinas: we make distinctions between divine attributes because we can't fully grasp the divine perfection
< > Scotus: the distinctions we make reflect distinctions in God himself
- Immortality belongs to the *credibilia* (cannot be philosophically proven) (225)
- The will is essentially a free power, intellect is not. The will is the seat of love and love of God is more important than knowledge of him (225);
- Freedom is a man's most striking characteristic and love its highest activity
< > Aristotle emphasized above all man's *intellectual* activity.(225*in fine*)

One of the greatest discussions of the MA.
Until the 19the C. this question in philosophy was medieval.
In contemporary phil. We talk a lot about signs (words, traffic lights) in terms of types and tokens.
Two physical instances of the same word (e.g. tree –tree) are called tokens and types

Realistic view / line / approach (< res)	**Nominalist (nomen) / conceptualist view**

There is an entity that is repeatable, that can be instantiated at more than one instance at once. Two things can share a same thing (e.g. whiteness).	There are two individuals with a non-repeating property of whiteness. It's you who draw the conclusion that they look alike. Likeness is just a name, it has no fundament.
There is something corresponding to universal predicates (whiteness)	Universal predicates are just names
There are extra-mental things corresponding to our general, universal terms.There is a reality, an entity, allowing us to state that Socrates is a human being.	
Plato is realist *par excellence* : guarantees the immutability, the truth of our knowledge by postulating the ideas / forms.	
Realists are **interested in saving our knowledge of the world**, to make sure that when we're using general terms, that there is something outside we're talking about.	
How is it that when I see Socrates, I come up with the concept 'human being'? There has to be some reason when I look at you guys, I come up with the concept human being, but not when I look at a cloud with a similar shape.	I'm a creature with the ability to do this.
Epistemological advantage: they can say how they get knowledge and how they can justify it whereas nominalists just mention an ability to simply do this.	**Ontological advantage**, because realists would have to explain what this 'human being' is and how it relates to all instances of 'human being'.

Types	**Tokens**
Abstractions	Two physical instances of the same word, 2 tokens of the same type.
Universals (abstract objects, intelligible objects)	Instances / particulars (concrete objects)

It has to do with justifying what you know and making sure that what you know is really knowledge. How do you know the world and what kind of justification have you got to make certain claims about the world?
In any kind of predication in which you're attributing a characteristic to something in the outside world.

E.g. a) "Socrates is a human being"

b) "Plato is a human being"

The question in the problem of universals is: 'What's this 'human being' we're talking about?'

- I think I know something about reality when I say that Plato is a human being, but if we really do know something about reality and if we're justified to state a and b, than there should be some human being out there that justifies and allows us to say about reality that Socrates is part of reality and that he is in fact a human being. If the statement is true, than there really has to be something out there corresponding to the concept. There has to be some feature of reality that allows me truly to say this about them.
  = **realist position about universals** [if nothing outside there corresponds to our general terms, we shouldn't be using them] > the world mirrors language: if you got a word and you can use it, than there will be something outside (i.e. extra-mental) corresponding to it.
  Plato is the realist *par excellence*: Socrates and Plato are just pale shadows of the idea of human being in the intelligible world, they participate in this idea. The universal idea of human being exists, we're just instances.

- **Nominalists** will almost always raise the question: 'Where is the entity you're talking about? (= ontological grounds) Where is this human being, I can see individual human beings, but I haven't seen the entity that corresponds to your general terms, neither have I been shown how this general terms relates to '.

< > realist: how is it that when I see Socrates I come up with the concept 'human being'?

Porphyry (neoplatonic scholar (234-305), *Isagogè* (Introduction to Aristotle's categories, ten most classes/ types of things: substance, quality, quantity, duration ,action, passion, place, time, posture, state)

You can consider these thing as really telling how the world is, or as our way of dividing the world up without nothing really corresponding to it. Porphyry asks what categories and will ask **three questions** which he will not answer. [Where Porphyry wouldn't go, the medieval would go].

a) Whether genera and species are real or are real or just conceptual.
   [Do universals exist in extra-mental reality or are they just mental phenomena?]
b) If they are real, whether they're corporeal or incorporeal. [If they exist are they bodily or not?]
c) Whether they are separated or in sensible and have their reality in connection with them.
   [What is the relation between these universals and all of the instances that we see?]

Porphyrian trees show the relation between species and genus and difference for the category of substance.

Substance= most universal genus and species and genus are related.
The genus can be a species of a higher genus and the species is always the genus of a lower species.
Most specific species on the bottom of the tree.

- Tree from the most universal genus to the most specific species
  = metaphysical equivalent of our modern biology taxonomy

Boethius (the one who translated Porphyry from Greek into Latin and commented it and made it accessible to Latin middle agers).
Gave a definition (3 elements that are necessary characteristics of a universal).

a) If there are characteristics of universals, they have to belong to all of the singulars of that universal completely.
b) All the particulars should have it at the same time (not as if I had humanity and could pass it on to you, and so on)
c) It should constitute the substance of its particulars; it should be part of the physical make-up/ constitution of a particular of this type of universal: you all are essentially human beings and losing human beingness would turn you into something completely different.

In Karolingean period, some super realists (is there a word for it, than there shoud be something corresponding to it)
e.g. 'nothing' > corresponds to # > philosophy sometimes goes to far!

Peter Abelard contributed to the discussion. He's the first really solid defense of nominalism!
In his treatment , a commentary on Porphyry's Isagogè, he picks on all of the realists views of his time and more specifically on a view called **'material essence theory'**. (William of Champeaux)

- There's one essence, let's call it 'human being', and this is specified to Socrates on the various that make him into Socrates (length, weight, ...) > different accidents make you a different example of a HB than your neighbour
  Human beingness exists completely in Socrates and it exists differently in Plato only because of accidents

Material essence theory	**Plato**
Human beingness is actually part of the metaphysical make-up of Socrates and Plato. Much more robust than mere participation.	Socrates and Plato merely partake in the – separate – idea of human beingness.

Abelard: what about Socrates and a donkey? They have one and the same essence: animality

- **Abelard's problem**:

- Socrates is totally, essentially animal
- Brownie (donkey) is totally, essentially animal
- Socrates is totally, essentially rational
- Brownie is totally, essentially irrational
- Therefore animal is totally, essentially rational and irrational = a contradiction
  Any theory of universals that says that one and the same numerically one universal can exist in a number of different speces or in a number instances, you're gonna end up assigning to that numerically one universal contradictory qualities. *In casu* rationality and irrationality in one and the very same animality.

- Abelard says that just cannot have a theory of universals that says that the universal is numerically one and the same. Because as soon as you do that you're gonna have to predicate of that one and the same universal contradictory qualities or attributes.

Break
Opname ontbreekt! (na 110101_002)

Copleston:
- Are universals words or are they things? (69);
- Famous controversy between William of Champeaux (ultra realist) and Abelard (nominalist) (71);
-

Lecture 9: John Scotus on the medieval problem of future contingency and divine foreknowledge

Famous chapter 9 of "*De Int.* 9" (*De Interpretatione XI* and its 'seabattle example') of Aristotle. Aristotle asks about the truth value of various types of propositions and how the change of verb tense affects the truth value of these propositions.

E.g. 'Russ is standing' > Aristotle would say that this is true or false according to what the case is in reality (very simple correspondance theory of truth). Aristotle says that present tense propositions don't pose a problem.

Quid past tense propositions? E.g. 'At midnight last night Russ was reading' > depends on the correspondence with a state of affairs yesterday.

Quid future tense? 'Russ will win the lottery tomorrow'

- If there's parallelism with past and present tenses, and it's true, than Russ will win the lottery tomorrow whatever happens

This is how Aristotle motivates the problem of fatalism: 'everything is absolutely determined'

Principle ("law") of bivalence: principle according to which a statement is either true or false.
Aristotle motivates in *De Int.* XI - with the seabattle example - that bivalence holds in both past and in the present, but that it can't be the case that bivalence hold in the future: there's an asymmetry between the ways that tense propositions work. If future tense propositions were determined, than everything would be determined, we'd end up with fatalism, and that's absurd because we've got free will. Better to give up bivalence (the similitude between these kinds of statements) than to end up with fatalism.
Most people don't really believe in fatalism, they think we have free will and that it was given to us for a reason.

Wether the world is fatalistic or not is not so much in discussion in the MA, although most philosophers today.

Libertarians: 'your free will is not bound by any boundary determination' (e.g. John Scotus)
Compatibilists: 'free will is compatible with the determination of the will's choice'
Incompatibilists: either libertarians or ('esither free will or determined') fatalists ('our will is determined, get over it')

Aristotle doesn't give a proof as to whether there is free will.
Scotus: 'I can't proof there's contingency, I can't proof that there's free will, but he mentions AVICENNA (Persian thinker) who says that there's no free will should be beaten in the back yard until they admit free exists.

Importance of *De Int. IX* and the seabattle example = **logic matters**! A logical problem with enormous implications for metaphysics with the free will problem, for morality (ethical theory). It becomes an even bigger issue if you throw a providential God (cf. Christians) into the mix. Aristotle's God didn't care about the world, but the Christian God is omniscient and providential.

A Christian God *does* know whether there will be a seabattle, so now we need to argue for the existence of free will. > huge moral and theological implications. How can I reconcile God's divine foreknowledge with my free will? = **problem of future contingence**
A contingent = something what is possible but not necessary

For more than a 1000 years this problem went on in a scholastic way of viewing it, from Augustine until contemporaries of Leibniz and Kant. There are many possible solutions to reconcile divine foreknowledge (= God's knowledge of the future) and free will. We'll just look at two of them:

1) Augustine first suggested it, Boethius collaborated on and Aquinas ended up defending very eloquently in the XIIIth Relies on God's eternity and God's intellect.

2) John Scotus will reject 1) and will suggest an alternative that relies mostly on 'the divine will'.

Aquinas's view relies on eternity[22] in Boethius' highly influential view and uses this as the foundation to explain how God's foreknowledge is compatible with the contingency of the future and free will.
Nr. 4 handout (Aquinas):

An analogy with a ***man standing on a hill*** (God) (= Aquinas' governing analogy) and looking down the road while the people walking can just see the people before and after them. The past, the present and the future is laid down to God like a big panorama and **all of time is present to God just like the now is present to us.** God sees in his eternity all of time.
Aquinas thinks that the presence is in a very real sense **necessary. The necessity of the present.** It's not necessary for Socrates sitting there, the necessity of not being able to do more than one thing at the same time. = *conditional* necessity (= also a logical one: cf. If S is walking he's also moving, but it's not necessary for him to walk).

Strong preceding necessity	**Weak (benign) necessity**
No event is contingent, every event is pre-determined, is a malign, a bad necessity because it excludes free will.	**= conditional necessity** **Conditional on the (free) choice beforehand. Free will, chance and no-fatalism is possible.**

Handout nr. 2: I see S sitting there, there's some kind of necessity (conditional).
God has this weak benign necessity attached to his knowledge. ***God is watching just as I see Socrates sitting, it's necessary because S cannot be anywhere else. The choices are yours but the necessity of the present guarantees the infallibility of God's knowledge.***

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[22] In the MA – big issue in contemporary philosophy – eternity opposed to time and our temporal reality. BOETHIUS' definition is most common: eternity is the simultaneously hold and perfect possession of interminable life. Two elements:
a) unending existence/ life, has no term, no end.
b) all at once i.e. non-durational (no succession, not one thing after another)
'God is unending existence and he has it all at once'

Sum-up: The solution is built on God's eternity – God exists all at once with unending life – and all of our time is present to God; the present has got some kind of benign necessity attached to it. It's not an absolute necessity: you've got the choices / make the decisions, but when God sees them it has the same kind of necessity attached to it as the necessity of S being here. God has infallible knowledge on that basis.

The bottom-line for Aquinas is that choice exists until the decision is made. That's why he says that the present is necessary, which means that it's not future but present < > God sees *everything* as I see you right now and you see me.

Break

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How is it possible that God sees both present and future at once, there must be sort of an indexicality (A after B,...)
Contemporary philosophers of religion take the bull by the horns stating that God, from the moment of creation, has sort of a temporality associated with him, allowing him to understand the wordl in terms of past, present and future. ME philosophers wouldn't do that, they just thought that God is an eternity, something different fro time, without duration.
As soon as there's a creation, God needs a relation with the creation, and the temporality introduces this relation. [Friedman doesn't want to go into contemporary philosophy of religion].

The crux of Scotus' criticism of Aquinas (Scotus was working about 25 years after Aquinas' death)

Scotus	**Aquinas**
- The future doesn't exist yet and the past has ceased to exist, so how can both of them be present to God in the common sense notion of presence? - Can't see how God can be simultaneous all the time. God can only be simultaneous with what exists, i.e. the present, the 'now', what actually exists in time. - "A moment of time is all there is", "Only the temporal 'now' is present to eternity"	- God has a an entire *vista* (past, present an future)

- Beliefs in contingency nevertheless but wants it reconciled with divine foreknowledge in another way!
  - God is the cause of contingency in things, God has to cause contingently or else there'd be no contingency. (God has to be a contingent cause)
    Then: where does contingency in God come from?
    2 possible sources (nr. 42)
    a) Divine *intellect* (cf. Aquinas < > Scotus: insufficient!)
    b) **Divine *will***
    Until the divine will makes a choice, God's intellect understands any proposition that it entertains 'neutral'.

    In order to think how God's will canbe the cause of contingency, you have to figure out how God's will is free and therefore how our will is free!
    Categorisation of how the will can be free (three types of how the will can be free, of which we retain 2):
    a) Freedom with regard to opposite acts
    E.g. I love or I hate
    b) Freedom with regard to opposite objects
    E.g. I love Mary or loving Paul
    > From these two kinds of freedom we can deduce that there are two types of contingencies and two types of possibilities:

    1) **One kind in which the will is *successively* (over time) related to opposite objects (will first wills one thing and later another thing) > [Scotus brings up a common medieval logical tool: distinction between divided and composite sense of the propositons] §48**
    2) **A *logical* contingency (§49)**
       It's one to which a logical potency corresponds.
       E.g. 'there can be a world before the world existed' is logically consistent and therefore a genuine power for it to happen.
       ***Contrast with first type of contingency*: there is no change or succession here. At one and the same moment the world doesn't exist, and yet it's genuinely possible that it *does* exist**
       Cf. §50: <u>sort of a revolution in action theory and the notion of what it is to have free will</u>

< > Scotus: even when I've done the choice (i.e. going out the door) there is still some possibility some unexhausted potential for not going out the door. > to understand this you should map it on to 'possible worlds'

(uitwerking) So there has to be more than what Aquinas says! At the very instant at which I will to do something I have to have the possibility of willing to do the opposite of it, at the very same instant. Otherwise I'm not free! The **present is not strictly speaking necessary**.
There is no time in which you change your mind, there is no succession in which you could go from willing *a* to willing *b* so that will would not be free if it only existed for one instant, The only way you can say that it's free is if you add a genuine possibility while it's willing a to also will not-a, at one and the same instant. At one and the same instant it's willing a but it has the genuine possibility of willing not-a. If you don't accept that, you can't explain free will.
= '**The simultaneous capacity for opposites**'

Crucial for Scotus if you want to explain freedom and contingency: at the very same instant I want x, I *can* will not-x. It has to be a not-actualised ability, a real ability. You have to attribute the simultaneous capacity for opposites, unless the will is not free.

The **rationality aspect of choice** – the fact that we choose on the basis of reasons – **goes out of the window with Scotus' view**.
- **randomness**

- You have to have more than one option in order to be free

Being free requires that I'm free up to the very moment I do the act. Choice only lasts until the decision and choice is made.
I'm standing in front of a door and I have choice up until I open the door and go out. Then I have exhausted the choice. There is freedom and contingency only over time.

The present *is* necessary (in a benign way)

'Necessity of the present': The present is necessary, with that 'benign' necessity.
< > Scotus: when was your will free Aq: instant before
< > but instant before was then present en thus necessity
- **Scotus thinks that in Aq.'s view doesn't allow free will.**

Counter argument (randomness): You can come up with all the reasons, strongest reasons possible for x, your will can chose for not-x.
You always have reasons for what you do
Aquinas can't explain what role the will plays, where's that strong willing?

God's will is the source of all contingency in the world. It's contingent because in one instant of time it has SCO. God's intellect presents various contradictory propositions to the will (S sits at t / S doesn't sit at t), then the divine will says: 'check, S sits at t) and then the divine intellect knows (infallibily) that S sits at t. < > Ockham: If the divine will decides as S sits at t, and than Socrates is going t sit at t, and then either S can decide not to sit at t (then God is wrong) or S can't decide as to not sit at t (S has no free will)? So (Friedman) Scotus develops a great theory, a wonderful defence of libertarian freedom but in the process he destroys human free will by making God the absolute cause of everything. < > Scotus: there's a *contingent cause of causality* (Friedman: not of great help to Socrates, because he'll just think he's doing God's will) - The first theologian for whom contingency applied to God is not a bad word anymore. It's a very different view about God and God's attributes than Aquinas would have.	- God is a necessary being

Libertarians take Scotus' theory seriously, but have, like Scotus, difficulty accounting for the rationality of a choice. It seems sheer randomness.

Scotus wrap-up: contingency in the world has to come from God, it has to come from God's will, because God wills contingently. With the SCO because, God's will wills like that, there is contingency in the world. All contingency comes from God

Scouts is a realist

Now how does God know the future with certainty?

- Gods intellect presents / offers pairs of propositions to the divine will (X will drink tea at t1 / X will not drink tea at t1)
- The divine intellect understands them both neutrally, they don't have truth value.
- It's the divine will that is source of contingency, chooses an alternative, the intellect then 'sees' what the will has chosen, therefore the intellect knows it with absolute certainty'

< > Ockham: Scotus gets himself into a dilemma. Either the divine intellect is wrong en thus not infallible, or divine free will decided everything and human free will doesn't exist.

< > Scotus: the divine will wills *contingently*

< > Ockham: yes but what about *my* free will, either I have it or I don't.

Last Lecture: Ockham on ethics and the connection of the virtues

Copleston on Ockham

- ***Franciscan***
- ***Was excommunicated and died probably of the Black Death***
- ***<u>Believed</u> in human mortality (spitritual and immortal soul) but didn't believe that the philosopher could prove this, neither the opposite (p. 7); >> narrowing the philosophical field***
- ***Refuses to allow that essence and existence are really distinct < > Aquinas (249)***
- ***Similarly interprets the distinction possibility-act as a distinction between two modalities of a statement***
- [Terminists (nominalists) were obviously not concerned with producing world-views, the effect of the *via moderna* was to simplify the existing ones (330)]
- There is such thing as an 'Ockhamist world view': *things are and are* as *they are because God wills so*

  > On the one hand distinct substances, no one of which exists necessarily and between which there are no necessary connections (= philosophical half of the picture), on the other hand the complementary picture of these substances and the connections between them depending on the omnipotent divine will (= theological half).

- Most famous for his Logic
- XIVth Century[23], shifting of interest in philosophy to logical and analytical inquiries rather than creation of coprehensive syntheses; an attempt to dehellenize Christian thought, eliminating elements of 'necessitarianism' (239), growing separation between theology and philosophy (***C*** 231-32)
- Where Aquinas (+1274) (XIIIth C.) was still figuring out how Aristotle could fit in his world view
- John Duns Scotus (+1308) comes about 40 years later, sort of digested the Aristotelian material and challenging it, how to go beyond it:
  - e.g. *synchronic possibilities*
  - *Universals*: the common nature that's a non-numeric unity to it
- Ockham reacted to Scotus
  a) Ockham is a *nominalist* when it comes to universals (generality, universality exists in the mind alone which is difficult to the nominalist, explain how generality comes to the mind when there's nothing out there to what it corresponds cf. *supra*)
  b) Criticism to Scotus' view on future contingency and Gods foreknowledge

- Less well known for his ethical theory, which we'll discus today.

Little bit of background on virtues and virtue ethics:

a) **Prudence** (*phronèsis*, practical knowledge) = intellectual virtue
b) Ethical virtues like **temperance** (moderation), **courage**, **justice**. (biggies in the MA)
c) Theological virtues faith hope and charity
d) Augustine: honesty, friendship.

Originally from *Nichomachean Ethics* (book on happiness, 'eudamonia' = flourishing, thriving, well-being, not the kind of subjective happiness (partying, buying))
E.g. happiness like what the parents mean about their child "he'll not happy with that decision" = sort of an overview that says you're not going in the right direction, type of objective happiness, establishable on basis of argument.
Wealth, power, health, ease, relaxation, ... none of them will work. The ultimate happiness.
Handout nr. 1: *function-argument* What s specifically human: our rationality, so happiness has to do something with that. A happiness of a human, he says, is a life of action in accordance with reason. Acting in such a way that we make ourself the best specimen of our natural kind buy actualising our most proper characteristic i.e. our rationality. We're truly flourishing when we live a life of reason in activity.

// Aquinas: (nr. 2) argument for the *convertibility of being and goodness* has something like this. Being and goodness are the same in reality but they differ conceptually. Everything seeks the good, good=perfection, perfection= actuality and actuality is existence. Desire comes from actuality. We become good by actualising ourselves. This is true for Cf. The knife-analogy: the duller a knife becomes, the less it *is* a knife until finally one might question if it's a knife at all. Cf. Human beings: the more you use your rationality, the more human toy are. We actualise this rationality (nr.3) by gaining knowledge or by becoming virtuous.

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[23] Considered by Thomists as representing a critical and even destructive phase of thought (***C*** 232) whereas the XIIIth was the high peak of medieval philosophical thought (Aquinas).

Why do virtues help you with your eudaimonia, with your flourishing. Because they are the subset of the conditions all human beings need to live a happy life, because you'll never be able to actualise your potentialities without the virtues. Virtues as necessary qualities. Without virtue you won't be able to flourish, life is full of dangers, so you'll need some courage to maximise your human-ness. Without temperance moderation you'll fall into all kind of temptations, drinking too much or taking crack-cocaïne, buying too many cd's and go broke,... and that goes against your flourishing. Virtues are qualities you need to live an active life of reason.

Virtues are mental reflexes, habits with moral importance (not like tea-drinking). When put in a situation requiring e.g. justice, these mental habits dispose you to act justly in that situation. A courageous person will do the courageous, just, moderate thing.
These habits are learned: no one is born a virtuous person, you're born with rational abilities but not with virtues. That's why it's important to have good friends and family, because they're going to teach you virtues and have a flourishing life.

Ockham talks about this (§143) 'we learn virtues by doing them'
E.g. first courageous act *c1* (at age 12), we develop a certain reserve for it, a habit *h1*, which inclines you in a situation requiring courage to do *c2*, >> ***feed-back loop***: you keep strengthening your habit every time you have an act. (acts and habits relate together)
Memory works also in this habituating way, says Ockham.
Virtues are the habit that arise on the basis of an act and the habit inclines you to more acts of the same type. You can lose the habit by not exercising it anymore or by deciding that it doesn't matter.
We do this act and habit feedback-loop so much that it becomes part of us, it becomes our second nature. In a situation that requires courage you'll automatically do the right thing, you'll have become a just person.

[You need an indication that it in fact is the right thing to do: prudence]

What are the crucial elements in Aristotle's theory of virtue ethics that will also apply to medieval theory of virtue ethics?

- 'The doctrine of the mean': a courageous person isn't coward but neither overly courageous. There's a spectrum involved in any virtue: cowardness < **courage** < stupidity
  It's gonna differ from situation to situation. Here practical wisdom / prudence comes in.
  Prudence as a way of sizing up the situation. So that you carry out your virtue to the right degree on the spectrum. The person wo has prudence knows where on the scale should his actions fall right then.
  Prudence as a *central* virtue, it's being given a priority.

Aquinas	**Ockham**
Without the virtues you cannot have practical wisdom either	Disagrees.

  Aristotle says that unless you have practical wisdom, you're not being courageous ('cause it isn't "guided")
  The person of virtue has to have practical reason in order to guide his decision.
  Prudence as being able to get right what your response should be when you're inclined by your virtues to respond to a situation.

  Ockham's text is about **the unity of the virtues** (medieval vocabulary: the connection of the virtues).

  Classic approach: arètè (virtuous person is *excellent*)
  The Stoïcs: you couldn't have any virtue unless you had all of them 100% cf. Metaphore of the drowning men: being 10 cm below the surface or 100 m. Down, you're still not virtuous.
  Intuition behind it:
  E.g. a judge, someone who's a just person, with the virtue of justice, but she's in fact coward.
  The only way she's going to be able to resist a threat to her sense of justice, she'll have to be courageous.

  Or a cashier in a supermarket with a 100% sense of justice but without moderation (she's an alcoholic), her justice will be compromised by the lack of moderation.
  Idea behind the 'unity of the virtues': if you don't have all the virtues to a really high degree, it's gonna compromise the whole situation. You can't be a just person if you are a courageous person and a temperate person.

  Break

Contemporary virtue ethicists go back to Aristotle and consider that it offers something that the other major currents don't: in-built character, I'm acting justly because I'm a just person as opposed to duty.

Vices work the same way as virtues. Taught by your surroundings (cf. Augustine picking the pears) and feedback-loop. The more you exercise your vice, the stronger it gets. The virtue/vice is deeply ingrained in you.

Handout nr. 4: parallel argument to Abelard: **the intention is what matters**, the act itself is of no moral importance

Handout nr. 5: Ockham holds **a complete libertarian view of free will**: freedom = everything being the same I could equally do or not do x.

- The world, according to Ockham is a mechanistic place, the only form of contingency arises from the free will. // reminds of Scotus athough Ockham disagrees on the synchronic possibilities.
  Text : very good student notes

There is a gradation in virtues: 5 degrees allowing an extreme nuance as to when virtues are connected to another and when not.

First degree:	willing the performance of just works in accordance with reason (right reasons convince me and I'm doing it for the sake of the work as a right end) [e.g. doing it here and now, just in this case; helping an old lady across the street, no general commitment] = most people
Degree two:	= degree 1 + willingness to do so even if someone threatened you with your life [e.g. honour thy father] = much more generalised, you think you'd hold on to it even when you'd be threatened
Degree three:	= degree 2 (general commitment, at least hypothetically) + but it's undertaken precisely and solely for the right reason. You're committed just because practical wisdom is dictating it. Commitment to the virtue as the virtue. = *philosophical virtue*
Degree four:	= 1 + 2+ 3 and not doing it for the right reason, but *out of love for God*. Precisely on account of the love of God. = *Perfect and true moral virtue*
Degree five:	Heroic virtue = *Supererogotary acts* (nobody would expect most people to do this) E.g. effectively threatened with death but nevertheless loving your father. < > in degree 2: no real threat, the intention is good Here: you're gonna be tortured. The deed is not what matters. (=Gandhi, Mandela)

In his text Ockham discusses 2 views on the connection of the virtues:

Thomas Aquinas	**Henry of Ghent**
- All of the normal virtues and practical knowledge are connected; if you don't have them all, you'll be corrupted. - There are certain virtues (*magnanimity* (very generous)) and *magnificence* which only certain people can excercise (because they have lots of money). < > Ockham doesn't see this well explained **"Independance of act-opportunity-principle"**	- Talks about the various grades of virtue, but at a lower grade there's no necessity of connection of the virtue, but it is necessary at a higher grade. The reason for connection at the higher 2 grades is necessary in support of the others. Justice will not be preserved unless the judge is also courageous. < > Ockham: we never have to have a unity of the virtues given the *IAO-principle* (cf. §106) E.g. nun in her cell, perfectly moderate, but never threatened, so absolutely no courage. *If you don't have the opportunity to act, you'll never build up a habit corresponding to the act.*

Interesting about Ockham is the way virtues can relate to each other

§154: let's say that you are a really (third or 4th degree) **just** person (judge), but you may never have had the opportunity to be courageous. Ockham says that a high sense of justice will lead you to a first act of another virtue as soon as the opportunity arises.
Quid in case of a second degree virtue?

E.g. second degree temperance, but if someone forces you to fornicate, this will lead you to the first act of courage. But if a temperate (II) person is threatened to do an injustice, then your virtue of temperance doesn't incline you to refuse, because your virtue is not being threatened

Crux: Via his IAO-principle and with his gradation Ockham can give a nuanced account of how virtues relate to one another and he'll say that never ever will there be a necessary unity of the virtues, although, given the right circumstances it may be that having a virtue to a sufficient degree leads you to acquire another virtue given the right circumstances.
Friedman finds this an extremely well-thought-out system for describing how virtues could / should be connected and unified.